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Abstract
Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines
the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether
reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both
Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors’ personality,
behavior, and luck on recipients, consistent with essentialism. Respondents also endorsed essen-
tialist effects even when denying that transplants would change a recipient’s category membership
(e.g., predicting that a recipient of a pig’s heart would act more pig-like but denying that the reci-
pient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from the strongest version of
the “minimalist” position (Strevens, 2000), an alternative to essentialism. Finally, studies asking
about a broader range of donor-to-recipient transfers indicated that Indians essentialized more
types of transfers than Americans, but neither sample essentialized monetary transfer. This sug-
gests that results from bodily transplant conditions reflect genuine essentialism rather than broader
magical thinking.
Keywords: Causal reasoning; Concepts; Culture; Psychology; Psychological essentialism
1. Introduction
In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s (1923) story The Adventure of the Creeping Man, an emi-
nent professor’s aide asks Sherlock Holmes to investigate some peculiar changes in the
professor’s behavior and appearance. The professor has become increasingly aggressive,
and his knuckles have become thickened and hairy; he has developed superhuman climb-
ing abilities, and at times he adopts a strange slouching gait. Holmes cleverly deduces
that the professor has been injecting himself with a serum derived from langur monkeys
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in an attempt to maintain his youth and energy. Although the serum does indeed fulfill its
intended purpose, it also causes the unfortunate side effects that so worried the profes-
sor’s aide.
The idea that a serum extracted from a monkey might produce monkey-like appearance
and behavior in a human seems clearly at odds with modern-day scientific thinking. How-
ever, psychological essentialism would predict that such an idea might nonetheless strike
people as intuitively plausible. Psychological essentialism is the theory that people tacitly
believe that some internal unseen essence or force determines the common outward
appearances and behaviors of the members of a natural kind (Gelman, 2003; Medin &
Ortony, 1989). For instance, a monkey’s gait, temperament, and climbing abilities are
seen as arising from an internal kind-specific monkey essence. In the case of the “creep-
ing man,” the professor’s monkey-like behaviors would thus be attributed to the transfer
of some of the monkey’s essence from inside the monkey—the essence’s natural home—
to the insides of the professor.
Numerous studies indicate that essentialism underlies much of how people reason
about natural kinds. Infants, toddlers, and preschoolers often generalize internal features
and behaviors based on category membership, even when category membership and per-
ceptual attributes conflict (e.g., preschoolers expect that a property attributed to a leaf-
insect will be found in other dissimilar-looking insects rather than a similar-looking leaf).
These results suggest a strong belief in the importance of the non-obvious in determining
category structure, which in turn licenses inductive inferences (Dewar & Xu, 2009;
Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder,
2004). Additionally, both children and adults expect animals to maintain their kind mem-
bership and species-typical behaviors even if external superficial features of the animal or
its environment are changed (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Keil, 1989). Notably, the
underlying basis is also seen as causal; people privilege internal causal features as bases
for categorization over non-causal or outward features (Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & Dennis,
2000; Gelman & Gottfried, 1996; Gelman & Kremer, 1991; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005).
Finally, people often construe certain categories as sharply bounded, natural, and immuta-
ble rather than invented and fluid—a pattern of thinking that is readily explained if
people attribute an inalterable and naturally occurring essence to these categories (Bastian
& Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009;
Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009).
One need not have beliefs about the precise nature or location of an essence to believe
that it exists and causes common features of category members. Rather, essentializing
may in some cases simply involve a belief that there is something deep, internal, and
unalterable that is causally responsible for an individual’s properties; this is often referred
to as an essence “placeholder” (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Importantly,
however, even though people need not have beliefs about the specific location of essence,
essences are thought to reside in internal parts (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gottfried &
Gelman, 2005; Newman & Keil, 2008). If essences are thought to pervade the internal
parts of people and animals, and to have causal powers, then the transfer of internal parts
from one individual to another may be thought to cause the recipient to take on some of
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the donor’s characteristics. This is, of course, precisely the premise behind Conan Doyle’s
“Creeping Man.” The current study focuses on this hypothesized pattern of essentialist
thinking, examining whether people systematically believe that transfer of various internal
bodily elements could cause recipients to become more like their donors.
We studied this hypothesized pattern of reasoning about bodily element transfers (here-
after referred to simply as “transplants”) by surveying two culturally distinct samples,
people living in the United States and in India. Psychological essentialism would be
reflected by the belief that transplants might confer the traits or characteristics of a donor
onto a recipient. Investigating such a reasoning bias in this domain serves to extend prior
work on psychological essentialism in several important ways. First, many of the essen-
tialist predictions that have been documented to date actually have some empirical sup-
port or grounding in reality: For instance, it is sensible to expect that members of the
same animal kind would share similar internal features, and that changes to the outward
appearance of an animal would not interfere with its membership in a species or its
innately determined behaviors. However, there is no scientific model to account for why
transplants might lead to transference of features. Thus, evidence of essentialist reasoning
about transplants would provide especially strong evidence for the far-reaching nature of
this style of thinking, because it would reflect a reasoning error.
The present studies also test the extent to which essentialist reasoning extends to the
social domain. The majority of studies on essentialism to date have focused on beliefs
about natural kinds, particularly animals. However, a number of researchers have pro-
posed that people often hold essentialist beliefs about social kinds (Allport, 1954; Astuti,
Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010;
Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Gelman & Heyman, 1999;
Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gil-White, 2001; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000;
Hirschfeld, 1996; McIntosh, 2009; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009;
Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), and, importantly, that essentialist beliefs may be linked to
stereotyping and social prejudice (Allport, 1954; Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Keller, 2005;
Leslie, in press a; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Smiler & Gelman, 2008). Thus, understand-
ing the nature and extent of social essentialism is of considerable interest. However,
previous work on social essentialism has focused primarily on race, gender, and ethnic
categories. Are these the only social categories that are essentialized, or might essentialist
thinking extend to other social categories? The current studies address this question by
asking respondents to consider transplants from members of a wide range of social cate-
gories (e.g., a philanthropist, a murderer, a homeless person, a person with a different
sexual orientation, as well as a person with a different gender), as well as transplants
from animals (a pig and a chimpanzee).
These studies also advance our understanding of essentialism by contributing to an
ongoing debate regarding the very existence of essentialism. Although many studies sug-
gest the operation of essentialism in people’s reasoning about a wide range of categories
(Gelman, 2003), one alternative account known as the “minimalist” position denies that
people’s category-based inferences involve a representation of essence at all (Strevens,
2000). The minimalist position instead suggests that people appeal to non-essentialist
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causal laws (so-called K-laws) linking kind membership with observable properties or
behaviors. Strevens further claims that belief in these K-laws is enough to explain the
data in favor of essentialism. Taking as an example the process by which one infers that
tigers will have stripes, Strevens explains, “… you must believe there is something about
tigers that causes them to have stripes, but you do not have to believe that this something
is essence. For example, you might have no opinion about what does the causing, or you
might think that a mechanism that is not an essence does the causing (as in modern bio-
logy), or you might think that it is just a brute fact about the world that being a tiger
causes an animal to grow stripes” (2000, p. 154).
According to minimalism, the causal laws linking kinds with observable features are
believed to be in effect for an individual so long as that individual has membership in
the relevant kind category; consequently, membership in a kind licenses predictions of
kind-typical behavior. On the strongest version of this claim, it is membership in a kind,
not an essence or any other further causal intermediary, that people appeal to as the basis
for predicting category-typical properties. We refer to this account as the “unmediated”
version of minimalism, in the sense that kind membership and properties are believed to
be directly connected by causal laws (e.g., it is just a “brute fact” that they are causally
linked [Strevens, 2000, p. 154; see also Figure 3, p. 155]). Another interpretation of the
minimalist position, however, allows that individuals may draw on specific mediating
causes linking kind membership and outward properties to draw kind-based inferences,
but it suggests that there is not sufficient evidence that these beliefs appeal to essences.
We refer to this reading as the “mediated” reading, in the sense that specific mediating
links may be represented (though they are described as non-essentialist).
On both the unmediated and mediated views described above, minimalism claims that
people’s inferences about natural kinds do not involve representation of a causal essence.
In contrast, psychological essentialism posits that people believe that individual members
of a kind have essences that pervade their internal parts and cause their external kind-typ-
ical appearance and behavior. A given individual is a member of a kind and displays
kind-typical features because it has this sort of essence.
In many respects, psychological essentialism and minimalism make very similar pre-
dictions, and to date no experiment has presented a direct test of the competing positions
(but see Ahn et al., 2001; Strevens, 2001, for a review of relevant indirect evidence). The
current study was designed to directly test predictions from essentialism and the unmedi-
ated reading of minimalism (see the General Discussion for issues related to a mediated
reading, specifically to what extent it constitutes a distinct theory from placeholder essen-
tialism, once it is appropriately constrained by the empirical evidence). Specifically, it
addressed this issue by asking respondents to consider not just whether transplants would
confer aspects of the donor on the recipient, but also whether the recipient’s category
membership would change to that of the donor. If respondents endorsed the possibility
that transplants might transfer characteristics of the donor without changing the recipi-
ent’s category membership, this would provide empirical support against unmediated min-
imalism because it would indicate that people were not simply basing predictions of
kind-typical behavior on category membership, but rather on an intervening causal force
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capable of being transmitted, and exerting its effects independent of category member-
ship. More generally, it would provide evidence, contra Strevens, that people rely on
more than just beliefs in K-laws linking category membership and typical properties in
their reasoning. (Interestingly, in the Conan Doyle story, the professor is not said to have
become a monkey—and so ceased to be a man—rather, he merely takes on some monkey
characteristics. Thus, the pattern of reasoning suggested by the Conan Doyle tale is not
readily explained by the unmediated minimalist approach.)
More broadly, investigating people’s essentialist beliefs about transplants also poten-
tially provides insight into the factors people may consider when donating and accepting
transplants. Transfer of internal body parts is now relatively commonplace across the
world; hundreds of thousands of soft tissue and bone transplants take place every year
(Lederer, 2008), and the types of organs that can be transplanted successfully are ever-
increasing. Although medical advances in transplant viability have provided more and
more people with improvements in quality and length of life, the need for organs far
outstrips the supply (Feeley & Moon, 2009). Investigating people’s implicit beliefs and
feelings about transplants may help contribute to our understanding of how people arrive
at the decision to become donors. Further, the shortage of human donors has prompted
scientists to investigate the possibility of “xenotransplantation,” in which organs are trans-
planted from non-human animals (usually pigs) to humans (McLean & Williamson,
2005). One outstanding question is whether essentialist beliefs will pose a significant
obstacle to the acceptance of xenotransplants.
To date, little research has focused on essentialist beliefs about transplants directly.
A number of anecdotal reports from transplant recipients hint at such essentialist thinking,
however. In Claire Sylvia’s autobiographical account A Change of Heart (1997), for
example, Sylvia attributes a series of personality changes following a heart and lung
transplant to her donor, claiming that her new cravings for beer, as well as increased
assertiveness and “masculine” energy, can be explained by having received the organs of
an 18-year-old male motorcycle enthusiast and avid beer drinker. Several studies of
attitudes about organ transplants also report evidence consistent with such essentialist rea-
soning. For example, people often report reluctance to receive organs from animals, and
sometimes from humans from different social groups, and consistently explain that reluc-
tance by suggesting that transplants might cause both their appearance and personality to
become more similar to those of their donors (Basch, 1973; Belk, 1990; Coffman et al.,
1998; Hayward & Madill, 2003; Sanner, 2001a,b). And in a small survey of heart recipi-
ents, a full third of respondents endorsed the possibility of having taken on aspects of
their human donor’s personality or other psychological properties (Inspector, Kutz, &
David, 2004).
The studies described above certainly suggest that people may hold essentialist beliefs
concerning organ transplants. However, the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the
prevalence of essentialism are limited, because these studies either focused exclusively on
small samples of individuals who had already received a transplant, or the study design
consisted of minimally structured interview techniques. To address these limitations, we
designed the current studies to target two large culturally distinct samples (American and
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Indian), and we employed a series of structured survey questions directly addressing
essentialist construals of transplants.
One systematic psychological study on transplants provides highly relevant evidence
regarding our research question. Hood, Gjersoe, Donnelly, Byers, and Itajkura (2011)
investigated people’s views on receiving transplants from a highly immoral donor
(a violent murderer) versus a morally positive donor (a volunteer worker). When asked to
consider receiving either a heart or a kidney transplant, participants’ ratings of happiness
dropped substantially from baseline (i.e., the happiness rating when the identity of the
hypothetical donor was unknown) if they were told that the hypothetical donor was a
murderer. Further, this decrease was significantly larger than the corresponding increase
in happiness that occurred if participants were told that the donor was a volunteer worker,
which suggests that individuals were more sensitive to the negativity in a morally objec-
tionable donor than they were to the positivity in a morally upright donor.
Hood and colleagues couch their findings in the larger literature concerned with the
notion of “moral contagion,” which was pioneered by Paul Rozin and his colleagues.
Studies of moral contagion have found that people are extremely uncomfortable with the
idea of coming into contact with personal items that belonged to individuals deemed mor-
ally negative (e.g., Hitler’s sweater). In contrast, contact with morally positive individuals
(e.g., Mother Teresa) also affects value judgments (Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood,
2009; Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011), but typically it does not elicit comparably
large gains in positive emotions, paralleling the effect found by Hood et al. (2011;
Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994; Rozin, Millman, &
Nemeroff, 1986). Nemeroff and Rozin (1994) suggest that one of the reasons that individ-
uals are so uncomfortable with physical contact (albeit indirect) with immoral individuals
is that they are concerned about a transfer of essence: “The underlying assumption …
either explicitly or implicitly, seems to be that, through contact, some ‘essence’ or ‘soul
stuff,’ some as yet undefined contagious entity, may be transmitted” (p. 159).
In their study of organ transplants, Hood et al. (2011) similarly suggest that respon-
dents are concerned that they may become morally contaminated by the murderer’s
essence, and note that such fears are predicted by psychological essentialism. However,
although the results from Hood et al. are indeed consistent with the claim that respon-
dents are employing essentialist reasoning, such reasoning is not necessarily responsible
for people’s discomfort with the idea of receiving a murderer’s organ. To be confident
that people are employing essentialist reasoning, one would need evidence that people are
concerned about the causal effects of the transplants, in particular that the transplant will
cause them to become more like the donor. This belief was not directly examined in
Hood and colleagues’ fascinating study on organ transplants. Furthermore, we know of
only two studies in the broader moral contagion literature that address the causal effects
predicted by essentialism. One is an unpublished study demonstrating that both older chil-
dren and adults reported that wearing Mr. Rogers’s sweater would result in friendlier
behavior, even when the person wearing it was unaware of its prior owner (Johnson &
Jacobs, 2001). The second is a finding that adults are more likely to expect members of a
culture to possess traits of animals they typically ingest versus animals they interact with,
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with one possible interpretation being that ingestion is believed to transfer a causal
essence (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1989).
Absent direct evidence of causal thinking, then, one cannot necessarily attribute Hood
and colleagues’ findings on organs to psychological essentialism. There are a number of
alternative non-causal reasoning patterns that could have led to unhappiness with a
murderer’s organ. For instance, people might feel “creeped out,” or feel that they have
been contaminated, or experience other negative emotions when thinking about
contact with the organs of a morally negative person. None of these negative reactions
necessarily involves fearing that they would become like the donor, and so do not require
essentialist thinking. People might also consider the social ramifications of receiving an
organ from a criminal, expecting that others might view them with suspicion or disgust.
Finally, people might simply assume that a murderer would be more likely to have
engaged in unhealthy behaviors that would weaken the physical integrity or function of
the organ (e.g., drug and alcohol abuse), thereby rendering it less desirable.
We designed the current studies to investigate essentialism and its implications
directly. On the basis of the pervasiveness of essentialist thinking when considering the
relation between categories and outward properties in other domains (Gelman, 2003), we
predicted that people would also employ essentialist thinking here, and so would report
that a transplant would have causal consequences—namely causing the recipient to take
on characteristics of the donor. Study 1 was a survey of American respondents, whereas
Study 2 employed the same survey with a sample of Indian respondents to investigate the
ways that essentialism about transplants may be manifested in these different countries.
We also assessed other potential reactions to transplants that were not grounded in essen-
tialist biases. Study 3 served as a control study, assessing whether respondents (both
American and Indian) endorsed causal effects for the transfer of something that was
non-bodily, namely money. If respondents endorsed causal change for bodily transplants
but not for money, this would strengthen the argument that people were displaying genu-
ine essentialism in reasoning about transplants. Finally, Study 4 (also with American and
Indian respondents) addressed whether essentializing of bodily transplants depended on
whether the bodily element was internal and/or biological.
2. Study 1
To address the complexities involved in the expression of essentialist and non-essen-
tialist reasoning about internal bodily elements, we manipulated donor type, transplant
type, and recipient identity. We first provide an overview of the survey and then address
each of these manipulations below. Surveys started with a vignette introducing a hypo-
thetical transplant, described as necessary for the recipient’s continued health. Respon-
dents next viewed a list of possible donors and rank-ordered them according to how
much they would like each one to be the donor. Respondents then considered each donor
in turn and provided a liking rating indicating how much they liked the idea of each one
being a donor, and then provided an open-ended explanation for their liking ratings.
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Finally, they answered four Likert-scale questions, two of which assessed causal-essen-
tialist beliefs, and the other two of which assessed non-essentialist beliefs.1 Notably,
essentialist and non-essentialist inferences were not mutually exclusive, and an individual
could simultaneously endorse both (e.g., a respondent could both endorse the idea that a
transplant might confer a donor’s traits on the recipient [essentialist] and express
concerns that others might view the recipient differently after the transplant [non-
essentialist]).
An Essentialism composite score was derived from responses to the two essentialist
questions. The first essentialist question, Personality/Behavior, assessed people’s beliefs
that the transplant would cause the recipient’s personality or behavior to become more
like the donor’s. The second essentialist question, Luck, assessed an alternative form of
essentialist thinking by asking whether individuals might expect a transplant to cause for-
tunate or unfortunate events to befall them—the idea being that one’s essence might also
be seen as causally involved in bringing about one’s circumstances (see Olson, Banaji,
Dweck, & Spelke, 2006; for evidence that even young children negatively evaluate
individuals who experience bad luck and extend this judgment to others in the same
social group, as well as Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006 for evidence of adults’ beliefs in
“immanent justice”—the idea that prior misdeeds causally bring about misfortune or pun-
ishment). Endorsement of either the personality/behavior change or luck change questions
would constitute evidence for essentialism, because it is these endorsements that explic-
itly reflect beliefs in the causal relationship between essence and outward properties or
circumstances. In other words, both cases entail a change in the recipient of the trans-
plant, whereby the recipient takes on characteristics of the donor (personality/behavior or
luck).
Similarly, a Non-Essentialist composite score was derived from responses to the two
non-essentialist questions. The first non-essentialist question, Reputation, asked respon-
dents about the degree to which they believed that others might view them more nega-
tively or positively post-transplant. The second non-essentialist question, Creeped Out/
Contaminated, assessed the degree to which respondents anticipated disgust or feelings of
dirtiness or contamination upon their receiving the transplant. On the basis of past
surveys suggesting essentialist views of organ transplants (Basch, 1973; Belk, 1990;
Coffman et al., 1998; Hayward & Madill, 2003; Sanner, 2001a,b) as well as studies of
disgust, contagion, and purity (e.g., Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994), we predicted that respon-
dents would endorse both kinds of reasoning.
Donor types. Respondents were provided with a wide range of potential donors
(Table 1), classified into five groups: similar-to-self, different-from-self, positive, nega-
tive, and cross-species. We provided similar-to-self types to assess baseline ratings. That
is, we assumed that donors who were similar to the respondent (either through close fam-
ily ties or possession of similar characteristics and environmental background) would be
construed as contributing the most similar essence (and thus effect the fewest changes).
Thus, scores for various feelings or beliefs about the effects of these transplants would
provide a baseline reference point against which we could compare scores for more
dissimilar donor types. Different-from-self types were described as differing from the
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respondent on a major and culturally salient dimension (gender and sexual orientation).
Positive and negative donor types were also included, inspired by past studies of magical
contagion and feelings about organ transplants (e.g., Hood et al., 2011; Nemeroff &
Rozin, 1994). Positive donor types were described as possessing positive attributes (being
highly intelligent) or performing positive acts (philanthropy). Negative donor types were
described as being in negative environmental circumstances (homeless) or having per-
formed negative acts (murder). Finally, respondents considered non-human (cross-species)
donors, which we included in light of findings that animal species typically are highly
essentialized (Atran & Medin, 2008; Gelman, 2003; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009) as
well as people’s reported discomfort with this type of donor as found in earlier studies
(Coffman et al., 1998; Sanner, 2001a,b).
The use of cross-species donor types also provided an opportunity to test the different
predictions made by essentialism and unmediated minimalism (Strevens, 2000). Recall
Table 1
Donor types and individual donors in each type for Studies 1–3 and Study 4
Donor Type Donora
Studies 1–3
Similar-to-self (baseline) Same gender, blood-related family member
Same gender, sexual orientation, age, and background as respondent
Different-from-self Different gender, same age and background as respondent
Different sexual orientation, same gender, age, and background as respondent
Positive Same gender, high IQ
Same gender, well known for philanthropy and charity work
Negative Same gender, convicted of violent murder
Same gender, homeless
Cross-species Pig
Chimpanzee
Study 4 (described as same gender)
Positive A person with a high IQ
Charity worker who gave money to good causes
Kind person liked by many
Talented artist
Talented mathematician
Talented musician
Negative Homeless person
Person with a low IQ
Schizophrenic
Thief
Compulsive gambler
Violent murderer
Note. aActual terminology specifying gender of donors depended on respondents’ self-reported gender,
obtained prior to survey administration. “Same gender” was termed “man” or “male” for male respondents
and “woman” or “female” for female respondents; “different gender” was termed “woman” or “female” for
male respondents and “man” or “male” for female respondents; for instance, text for a male respondent for
the murderer donor was “man convicted of violent murder.”
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that according to this view, two claims are central: First, essences are not systematically
represented in people’s kind-based inferences, and second, individuals appeal instead
directly to kind membership as a basis for predicting kind-typical behavior (as kind mem-
bership is the necessary condition for “K-laws,” or causal laws linking kinds with proper-
ties, to be in effect). On this view, respondents should judge that cross-species transplants
would bring about changes in personality/behavior or luck only if they also judge that the
transplant would bring about a change in category membership, because this interpreta-
tion of minimalism holds that it is category membership rather than essence that is
believed to be the basis for people’s predictions of outward behaviors. In contrast, an
essentialist construal of organs would allow for transplants to result in outward changes
in the recipient despite the recipient’s original category membership remaining the same.
To address the competing claims of essentialism and unmediated minimalism, we
added a question for the cross-species items, “If you received the transplant/transfusion
from a (pig/chimpanzee), would you be a (pig/chimpanzee) after the transplant/transfu-
sion?” (We did not include this question for within-human transplants, because Strevens
does not discuss social categories, and it remains unclear how to extend the minimalist
view to encompass them. For example, is a murderer’s negative behavior to be attributed
to his/her membership in the social category murderers? This is a problematic explana-
tion since one only comes to belong to this social kind by engaging in negative behavior
in the first place—namely by murdering someone. So it remains unclear how one could
make sense of unmediated minimalism for such categories.) We then analyzed responses
on the questions assessing essentialist change only for those individuals who did not
endorse category change. On the basis of the wealth of studies indicating the presence of
essentialism in other domains of reasoning, we expected our findings to support essential-
ism rather than unmediated minimalism; that is, we expected that people would still
endorse transfer of personality, behavior, or luck, even if they denied that the transplant
would change their category membership.
Transplant types. To investigate whether participants would respond differentially to
different kinds of transplants, we created three versions of the survey, each one asking
about a distinct type of internal physical transfer: a blood transfusion, a DNA transplant,
and a heart transplant. However, because receiving a heart from a family member would
entail the family member’s death, the family member as a potential donor for the heart
transplant was omitted. On the basis of findings suggesting that adults believe essence to
be widely distributed in the body (Newman & Keil, 2008), we expected that all three
types of transfer would lead respondents to expect essence-based effects, that is, score
higher on the Essentialist measure for non-similar-to-self donor types relative to baseline
similar-to-self types. Another reason to predict essentialist reasoning for all three trans-
plant types can be found in the numerous expressions and metaphors that bear witness to
essentialist beliefs about the heart (e.g., the seat of emotion, kindness, or morality) and
blood (e.g., hot- or cold-blooded temperaments). However, given recent advances in
biology and genomics, educated adults are well aware that DNA plays a part in causing
outward properties and behaviors (though of course people’s understanding of the specif-
ics may be sketchy or inaccurate; Mayr, 1982), and in light of this, we expected that
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people would be especially likely to expect a DNA transplant to have a causal influence.
This pattern of thinking would lead to higher scores on the Essentialist measure for the
DNA transplant relative to the heart transplant and blood transfusion scenarios.
Recipient identity. As a final manipulation, we asked respondents to consider trans-
plants given to either themselves or to their (hypothetical) infants. This manipulation was
included to control for the possibility that, when considering themselves as the recipient,
people might believe that knowing they had received a transplant might cause them to act
more like the donor; for example, respondents might imagine that knowing they had
received the organ of a murderer might cause them to behave more violently because
they thought that they should. This would result in higher scores on the Essentialist
measure, but it would not constitute essentialist reasoning. The inclusion of infants (who
would be unaware of the transplant and thus not prone to this “placebo” effect) allowed
us to assess beliefs about transplants independent of this concern; no differences, how-
ever, were expected along this dimension in terms of its interaction with effects for donor
or transplant type (the two major manipulations for which we expected main effects).
Summary of Predictions
• Liking Ratings: Different-from-self, negative, and cross-species donor types will be
liked less than similar-to-self (baseline) donor types; liking for positive donor types
will be weakly or not differentiated from similar-to-self types. Such findings would
in part replicate those found in previous assessments of moral contagion beliefs
(Hood et al., 2011; Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994) and would replicate studies demon-
strating distaste for receiving organs from non-human donors (e.g., Coffman et al.,
1998; Sanner, 2001a,b).
• Essentialist Measure: Essentialist beliefs about organ transplants will be revealed
by higher scores on the Essentialist measure for other donor types relative to simi-
lar-to-self donor types. This will hold true regardless of whether the transplant type
is blood, DNA, or heart, demonstrating that essence is construed as pervasive
throughout the body, as indicated in past studies of psychological essentialism (e.g.,
Newman & Keil, 2008); however, especially high scores were predicted for DNA,
given its known (though typically unspecified) role in causing outward features.
• Essentialist Measure and Minimalism: Higher scores on the Essentialist measure
for cross-species transplant types relative to similar-to-self types will be observed
even when respondents deny that receiving a transplant from a non-human animal
will lead to the recipient changing category membership. That is, it will be the
transferred essence per se that is represented as a causal force, rather than simply
category membership being used as a basis for predicting category-typical features.
Such findings would run counter to predictions from an unmediated reading of
minimalism, which denies that people systematically represent causal essences in
explaining how category-typical behaviors arise (Strevens, 2000).
• Non-Essentialist Measure: Non-essentialist styles of reasoning about transplants will
be revealed by higher scores on the Non-Essentialist measure for different-from-
self, negative, and cross-species donor types relative to similar-to-self donor types;
678 M. Meyer et al. / Cognitive Science 37 (2013)
in contrast, positive donor types may be weakly or not differentiated from similar-
to-self for this style of reasoning. These predictions are based on findings from the
moral contagion literature (e.g., Hood et al., 2011; Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994).
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Respondents (n = 104) were obtained using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a crowd-
sourcing platform that allows people to complete online tasks for compensation. We
offered the survey only to individuals in the United States and compensated each respon-
dent $1.85 for successful completion. Demographic information from these respondents
(obtained through self-report) is displayed in Table 2. Four additional respondents pro-
vided data that were discarded due to incorrect answers to attention-check questions
embedded in the main survey to ensure data were from actively participating respondents.
Additionally, data from two surveys associated with the same IP address were discarded,
as this indicated that a single person may have taken the survey twice.
2.1.2. Survey materials and scoring
Text of the survey questions appears in Table 3. Each survey began with a vignette
stating that the recipient or the recipient’s infant needed a transplant or transfusion for
continued health. A list of donors was provided for respondents to evaluate, all of which
were described as healthy, disease-free, and possessing compatible organs according to
the respondent’s doctor. We created three versions of the survey (blood, DNA, and heart),
each describing the relevant transplant or transfusion. Infant-as-recipient versus self-as-
recipient was a within-subjects variable, whereas transplant type (blood, DNA, heart) was
Table 2
Demographic characteristics of respondents in Studies 1–4
Demographics
Study 1
Americans
(n = 104)
Study 2
Indians
(n = 140)
Study 3
Americans
(n = 34)
Study 3
Indians
(n = 29)
Study 4
Americans
(n = 136)
Study 4
Indians
(n = 253)
Sex (%)
Male 44.2 66.3 23.5 75.9 44.9 67.6
Female 55.8 33.7 76.5 24.1 55.1 32.4
Age (years)
Mean (SD) 30.8 (9.8) 36.9 (12.7) 36.2 (12.3) 27.8 (10.1) 37.7 (11.87) 31.4 (10.31)
Religion (%)
Atheist/agnostic 29.8 0.0 27.3 0.0 25.0 1.2
Christian 59.6 16.4 65.2 6.9 66.9 16.3
Jewish 4.8 0.0 6.1 0.0 2.2 0.0
Hindu 3.8 66.4 0.0 72.4 0.0 68.4
Muslim 1.9 10.7 0.0 3.4 0.1 9.9
Other or unspecified 0.0 6.4 1.4 17.3 5.9 4.2
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a between-subjects variable. An approximately equal number of respondents answered
questions about each transplant type, and within each transplant type, approximately half
answered questions about their infants as recipients first and the other half about them-
selves as recipients first (cell sizes ranged from n = 16 to n = 19). Text of all six scenar-
ios (Blood to Infant, Blood to Self, DNA to Infant, DNA to Self, Heart to Infant, Heart
to Self) appears in Appendix A. Following each vignette, respondents rank-ordered their
preferences for all 10 donors. This gave respondents the opportunity to consider all
donors before responding to the target essentialist and non-essentialist questions.
Feelings and beliefs about each donor were assessed individually. Donors were pre-
sented in a randomly determined fixed order. Following each donor, respondents provided
a Likert-scale rating of how much they liked the idea of receiving a transplant from each
donor (Like), then an open-ended explanation describing the reason behind their rating,
and then responses to four Likert-scale questions addressing the target essentialist and
non-essentialist reasons: Personality/Behavior (essentialist), Luck (essentialist), Creeped
Table 3
Text of survey questions
Item Contenta/Scale
Preference The following is a list of potential donors. Please rank order the options
according to how much you would like to receive your transplant
from each individual.
Like Would you like to receive your transplant/transfusion from this
potential donor?
1–7: 1 = Definitely No, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Definitely Yes
Open-ended Please provide a brief explanation describing your reasoning. (no scale)
Essentialist:
Personality/behavior
To what extent do you think your personality or behavior might change
to become more like that of this donor after the transplant/transfusion?
1–7: 1 = Definitely Would Not Change, 4 = Not Sure, 7 = Definitely
Would Change
Essentialist: Luck To what extent do you think your luck might change if you received
your transplant/transfusion from this donor?
1–7: 1 = Become Much Less Lucky, 4 = Stay the Same, 7 = Become
Much More Lucky
Non-Essentialist: Reputation To what extent do you think that other people might view you differently
if you received your transplant/transfusion from this donor?
1 = 7: 1 = View Much More Negatively, 4 = View the Same, 7 = View Much
More Positively
Non-Essentialist:
Creeped out/contaminated
To what extent would you feel “creeped out” or “contaminated” if you
received your transplant/transfusion from this donor?
1–7: 1 = Not At All, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Very
Category changeb If you received the transplant/transfusion from a (pig/chimpanzee),
would you be a (pig/chimpanzee) after the transplant/transfusion?
1–7: 1 = Definitely No, 4 = Not Sure, 7 = Definitely Yes
Notes. aSelf-as-recipient wording is shown; respondents also answered an infant-as-recipient version in
which their hypothetical infants were described as the recipient of the transplant.
bCategory change questions were asked only for cross-species (pig and chimpanzee) donors.
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Out/Contaminated (non-essentialist), and Reputation (non-essentialist). Essentialist and
non-essentialist questions appeared in one of four possible orders determined by a Latin-
square design in approximately equal frequency within each transplant type (blood, DNA,
and heart) and recipient type order (infant as recipient first, self as recipient first).
Calculation of the Essentialist composite score was performed in two steps. First, the
absolute change in luck from the midpoint value of 4 ( = no change in luck) was
calculated and then fit to a 1–7 point scale. (This approach allowed comparable values to
be generated for both the Personality/Behavior and Luck items, with values of 1 always
indicating minimal effects [i.e., either no change in personality/behavior or no change in
luck], and 7 indicating maximal effects [i.e., the most change in personality/behavior or
change in luck].) Thus, absolute values of 0, 1, 2, and 3 were converted to adjusted
values of 1, 3, 5, and 7, respectively. Next, the average of the adjusted Luck score and
the Personality/Behavior score was calculated, and this average was used as the
Essentialist composite score. Calculation of the Non-Essentialist composite score was
performed similarly by (a) calculating the absolute change in reputation from the mid-
point value of 4 ( = no change in how others viewed the recipient) and then fitting this
to a 1–7 point scale and (b) taking the average of the adjusted Reputation score and the
Creeped Out/Contaminated score. Cronbach’s alpha was very high for both the composite
Essentialist measure and the composite Non-Essentialist measure (>0.9), thus validating
the composite measures.
For the cross-species donor types only, a Category Change question came last (after
the essentialist and non-essentialist questions), assessing whether cross-species transplants
were thought to result in the recipient changing his/her category membership. Finally,
two attention check items were also included, embedded within the main survey (To
indicate that you are paying attention to this survey, please respond by marking 3/6 for
this question). Respondents’ data were discarded if they did not answer as requested.
Demographic information was obtained after respondents provided their judgments about
all donors.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Overview
The data are presented in four main sections below: Liking data, Essentialist compos-
ite, Test of minimalism, and Non-Essentialist composite. Throughout, ratings for similar-
to-self donor types were considered a baseline rating, with planned uncorrected pairwise
comparisons conducted between similar-to-self (baseline) donor types and all other types
(different-from-self, positive, negative, and cross-species). As noted earlier, the heart
transplant item was not included for the family member donor trials, as we did not wish
to ask about the death of a family member. Thus, the baseline for the heart transplant
condition differed from the baseline for the other two conditions, in excluding that one
donor. Accordingly, we also conducted supplementary analyses without the family mem-
ber donor type, to determine whether the results held up when the same baseline was
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used for all three transplant conditions (reported in Table 4, footnote c). Finally, we pres-
ent data from respondents’ open-ended explanations.
In the main analyses of the Likert-scale measures (Liking ratings, Essentialist compos-
ite measure, and Non-Essentialist composite measure), ANOVAs were employed using a
mixed-factorial 3 (transplant type: blood, DNA, heart) 9 5 (donor type: similar-to-self,
different-from-self, positive, negative, and cross-species) design, with transplant type as
the between-subjects factor and donor type as the within-subjects factor. Preliminary anal-
yses including the within-subjects factor of recipient identity (infant vs. self) and the
between-subjects factor of respondent gender demonstrated that neither participated in
any interaction that reversed any main effects of donor type or transplant type. Given the
complexity of the design, we thus present analyses collapsed across recipient identity and
respondent gender.
2.2.2. Liking data: Rank-ordered preferences and Likert-scale ratings
Rank-ordered preferences. As ranking data were ordinal and thus not suited for para-
metric comparisons, a Friedman’s test was performed on respondents’ rankings for donor
Table 4
Liking, Essentialist, and Non-Essentialist scores by donor type for Study 1 (American respondents) and Study
2 (Indian respondents)
Donor Type
Measure
Liking Essentialist Non-Essentialist
M SD ta Sig.b M SD ta Sig.b M SD ta Sig.b
American respondents
Similar-to-self (baseline)c 6.45 0.79 – – 1.54 0.81 – – 1.42 0.68 – –
Positive 6.02 0.91 5.96 ** 1.84 1.10 4.00 ** 1.74 0.84 4.26 **
Different-from-self 4.87 1.34 12.57 ** 1.67 0.85 1.96 0.06 1.97 0.92 6.94 **
Negative 3.53 1.72 17.26 ** 1.86 0.96 3.96 ** 3.24 1.42 14.60 **
Cross-species 2.48 1.62 23.82 ** 2.22 1.39 5.51 ** 4.45 1.94 17.56 **
Indian respondents
Similar-to-self (baseline)c 6.10 1.10 – – 2.44 1.30 – – 2.42 1.52 – –
Positive 5.94 1.01 1.59 0.11 2.94 1.42 6.09 ** 2.71 1.38 4.09 **
Different-from-self 4.54 1.40 14.33 ** 2.65 1.23 2.66 * 2.83 1.36 4.67 **
Negative 3.75 1.41 16.53 ** 2.78 1.24 3.72 ** 3.47 1.35 8.82 **
Cross-species 1.94 1.51 27.25 ** 3.61 1.70 8.77 ** 5.19 1.54 17.29 **
Notes. aPairwise comparisons were always against scores for similar-to-self (baseline) donor types; Study
1 df = 103, Study 2 df = 139.
b*p < .05; **p < .01.
cSimilar-to-self baseline for the DNA and Blood conditions included scores for both the close family member
and an individual of same gender, age, sexual orientation, and background. However, as noted in the main
text, the baseline for the Heart condition only included scores for the latter (excluding the close family mem-
ber). We therefore also conducted secondary analyses equating for baseline (i.e., employing only the same
gender, age, sexual orientation, and background donors as baseline), which replicated all ANOVA donor type
main effects and patterns of significant and nonsignificant results from paired comparisons for both American
and Indian samples. Thus, results from this secondary analysis are entirely consistent with those reported in
the primary analysis.
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types. We collapsed across transplant type (blood, DNA, heart) for simplicity, leaving
transplant type to be explored in detail in the main parametric ANOVA analysis of Likert-
scale Liking ratings. Rankings significantly differed from each other, Friedman’s
v2(4) = 353.42, p < .001. Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests between similar-to-self and all
other donor types revealed that similar-to-self types were preferred significantly more
than all other donor types (different-from-self: Z = 8.74, positive: Z = 6.02, negative:
Z = 8.82, cross-species: Z = 8.85, all ps < .001).
Likert-scale ratings. The ANOVA (described above in the Results 2.2.1 overview)
revealed a main effect of donor type on liking ratings, F(4, 404) = 273. 56, p < .001,
g2p = 73. Paired comparisons of similar-to-self (baseline) types against all other types
revealed that transplants from similar-to-self types were liked significantly more than
transplants from all other types (Table 4), a pattern consistent with that revealed in the
preference rankings. No other main effects or interactions were observed.
2.2.3. Essentialist composite
The ANOVA (see Results overview) revealed a main effect of donor type on the Essen-
tialist composite measure, F(4, 404) = 17.99, p < .001, g2p = 0.15. Paired comparisons
of similar-to-self (baseline) types against all other types revealed that transplants from
similar-to-self types had lower scores than all other donor types, ps  .06 (Table 4).
There was also a main effect of transplant type, F(2, 101) = 3.18, p = .05, g2p = 0.06,
with post-hoc Tukey comparisons showing that DNA received significantly higher
scores (M = 2.09, SD = 0.93) than blood (M = 1.57, SD = 0.70), p = .04, with scores
for heart intermediate and not different from the other two (M = 1.82, SD = 0.96),
ps > .05. No other main effects or interactions were observed; most important, trans-
plant type did not interact with donor type (F(8, 404) = 1.35, p = .21), indicating that
the main effect seen for donor type that was indicative of essentialism was not
restricted to considerations of DNA transplants. American respondents thus broadly
endorsed the possibility that transplants from a range of individuals could cause changes
in the recipient’s outward features or circumstances. This result provides evidence for
essentialist reasoning.
It is arguably the case that the Personality/Behavior item (i.e., To what extent do you
think your personality or behavior might change to become more like that of this donor
after the transplant/transfusion?) is the most direct measure of what is typically consid-
ered essentialist thinking. Although our main analysis focused on the composite Essential-
ist measure including the Luck item, we also conducted a secondary analysis to ensure
that patterns remained the same when focusing exclusively on the more canonical
Personality/Behavior item. Analyses did indeed replicate results seen for the composite
Essentialist measure, namely showing (a) a significant main effect of donor type (F(4,
404) = 11.56, p < .001, g2p = 0.10) with paired comparisons indicating that scores for all
other donor types were significantly higher than for similar-to-self types, (b) a significant
main effect of transplant type (F(1, 101) = 5.65, p = .005, g2p = 0.10), with post-hoc
Tukey comparisons indicating that scores for DNA were higher than blood (p = .003),
with heart intermediate and not different from either, and (c) no interaction between
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donor type and transplant type (F(4, 404) = 1.29, p = .25). Thus, this secondary analysis
is entirely consistent with the primary analysis of the composite item.
Individual response patterns. The distribution of individual response patterns on the
Essentialist measure is presented in Table 5, focusing on comparisons between similar-to-
self and all other donor types. For each non-similar-to-self donor type, we present the
proportion of respondents providing the following three response patterns: (a) an average
score on the Essentialist measure that was lower for the non-similar-to-self type than the
similar-to-self type (a difference inconsistent with essentialism), (b) an average score on
the Essentialist measure that was equal for the non-similar-to-self and similar-to-self
types (also inconsistent with essentialism), and (c) an average score on the Essentialist
measure that was higher for the non-similar-to-self type than the similar-to-self type (con-
sistent with essentialism). If individuals did not expect essentialist effects, the predicted
distribution of individual responses would consist mostly of Pattern 2 responses (equal
scores), with lower and equal numbers of Pattern 1 and Pattern 3 responses. If, on the
other hand, individuals were employing essentialism, responses would be skewed toward
Pattern 3 (more Pattern 3 responses than Pattern 1 responses). This was indeed the case;
binomial tests comparing the number of individuals reporting higher scores on non-simi-
lar-to-self types versus the number of individuals reporting lower scores on non-similar-
to-self types were significant for all four donor types, ps < .03. Response patterns
indicating essentialism ranged from 31% of the time (for different-from-self types) to
52% of the time (for cross-species types).
2.2.4. Test of minimalism: Category change and essentialist reasoning
Recall that according to an unmediated reading of the minimalist hypothesis (Strevens,
2000), people explain individuals’ behavior based on an appeal to category membership,
rather than a causal essence. This view would thus predict that changes in personality,
behavior, or luck would be endorsed only in cases when respondents also endorsed
change in category membership. Essentialism, however, allows for endorsement of
change in personality, behavior, or luck absent endorsement of category change, because
Table 5
Proportion of respondents providing each of three response patterns on essentialist measure in Study 1 (Ame-
rican respondents) and Study 2 (Indian respondents)
Response Pattern
Donor Type
Different-from-Self Positive Negative Cross-Species
American respondents
Essentialism score lower than similar-to-self 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.10
Essentialism score equal to similar-to-self 0.53 0.51 0.43 0.38
Essentialism score higher than similar-to-self 0.31 0.38 0.48 0.52
Indian respondents
Essentialism score lower than similar-to-self 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.13
Essentialism score equal to similar-to-self 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.17
Essentialism score higher than similar-to-self 0.44 0.58 0.52 0.70
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the causal agent—essence—can be transferred. To address these competing claims, we
reexamined scores on the Essentialist composite measure as they related to scores on the
category change questions (i.e., If you received the transplant/transfusion from a (pig/
chimpanzee), would you be a (pig/chimpanzee) after the transplant/transfusion?). Scores
on the Essentialist measure for cross-species and similar-to-self donor types were again
compared, but this time including only scores from individuals who endorsed absolutely
no category change for any cross-species transplants (n = 85). Thus, we examined
whether people would display essentialist reasoning even when they wholly denied any
possibility of the recipient changing category. Scores for similar-to-self were again con-
sidered baseline and compared against scores for the cross-species donor types in a 2
(donor type: similar-to-self vs. cross-species) 9 3 (transplant type: blood, DNA, heart)
ANOVA.
A main effect of donor type was observed, F(1, 82) = 18.04, p < .001, g2p = 0.18, with
scores for cross-species types higher (M = 1.97, SD = 1.29) than for similar-to-self types
(M = 1.45, SD = 0.74). There were no other main effects or interactions. Thus, respon-
dents reported that a cross-species transplant could lead to outward changes in the recipi-
ent even when denying that that the transplant would change the recipient’s category
membership. This result is inconsistent with unmediated minimalism and consistent with
the idea that respondents expected transplants to transfer causal essence.
2.2.5. Non-Essentialist composite
The ANOVA (see Results overview) revealed a main effect of donor type on the Non-
Essentialist measure, F(4, 404) = 198.07, p < .001, g2p = 0.66. Paired comparisons of
similar-to-self (baseline) types against all other types revealed that transplants from
similar-to-self types had significantly lower scores than all other donor types (Table 4),
suggesting that respondents engaged in non-essentialist explanations for reasoning about
why transplants from certain types are desirable or not. No other main effects or interac-
tions were significant.
2.2.6. Open-ended explanations
We identified seven non-mutually exclusive categories of open-ended explanations: (a)
Safety/Health (explanations that appealed to the safety of the procedure or health of the
donor or recipient), (b) Morality (explanations that mentioned the moral status of the
donor or the overall moral ramifications of the transplant procedure), (c) Creeped Out/
Reputation (explanations that described feeling disgusted or creeped out, or beliefs that
others might view the recipient differently; these are the same dimensions that contrib-
uted to the Non-essentialist composite measure addressed by close-ended questions), (d)
Appeal to Category (explanations that offered the donor’s category membership as the
reason for a decision, apparently as if to convey that further explanation was unnecessary,
(e) Essentialist (explanations that described the possibility of a transplant conferring traits
or characteristics to the recipient; these correspond to the Essentialist composite measure
addressed by close-ended questions), (f) Denial of Essentialism (explanations that
contained explicit rejection of essentialist predictions), and (g) Unclear or Other
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(explanations that did not fall into any of the previous six categories). Prior to formal
coding, any mention of specific donor types or transplant types was replaced with neutral
“donor X” and “transplant X” text (e.g., “I worry that a heart from a man would be too
big” was modified to “I worry that a transplant X from a donor X would be too big”).
This was done so that coders would not be biased to identify certain explanation styles
preferentially according to donor or transplant type. A primary coder then classified
responses into the seven explanation types. A second coder provided classifications for
20% of responses, and disagreements were resolved through discussion. Agreement for
the categories ranged from very good to excellent, with Cohen’s kappa ranging from 0.72
to 0.86 (average Cohen’s j = 0.79). Sample explanations and classifications are displayed
in Table 6, and proportion of respondents providing each type of explanation for the dif-
ferent donor types is displayed in Table 7. Explanations that appealed to safety and health
(as well as unclear or other explanations) tended to predominate. However, explanations
corresponding with the close-ended Non-Essentialist composite measures were also
observed, and appeals to overall moral aspects and category membership were also fairly
common. Finally, although respondents sometimes explicitly rejected essentialist effects
in their explanations, essentialist explanations were also observed; in fact, a full 34.61%
of respondents gave at least one essentialist explanation across all their responses.
2.3. Discussion
This study replicated past findings regarding distaste for transplants from negative, dif-
ferent, and cross-species donor types. We also demonstrated that respondents preferred
transplants from similar-to-self types significantly more even than positive donor types.
This effect was unexpected given that positive individuals are unlikely by themselves to
elicit disgust or moral concerns (e.g., Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994) and suggests that, when
thinking about bodily transplants, the respondents in this study most preferred donors
who are most similar to themselves. Although we did not predict this finding, it is readily
explained by essentialism: If people think that receiving a transplant may lead to changes
in their essence, then they might reasonably dislike the idea of receiving a transplant
Table 6
Sample open-ended explanations according to type
Explanation Type Sample Explanation
Safety/health “Worried about disease”
Morality “Because philanthropists are kind-hearted people”
Creeped out/reputation “I will feel very contaminated and creepy”
Category label “Definitely no, because it’s a chimpanzee”
Essentialist “The cruel murderer’s qualities will come to me”
Denial of essentialism “The heart does not pass along any of those qualities”
Unclear/other “Sounds fine”
686 M. Meyer et al. / Cognitive Science 37 (2013)
from anyone who differs from them, even along a positive dimension. That is, people dis-
like the prospect of any change in their essence—positive or negative—and so any salient
difference between the donor and recipient leads to increased resistance to the transplant.
In this way, people’s specifically essentialist reasoning about transplants differs from their
more general way of reasoning about moral contagions.
Regarding the underlying reasons for people’s feelings about various donor types, we
found evidence for the role of essentialism. As predicted, essentialism was seen most
when reasoning about DNA transplants. However, it was also employed for other trans-
plant types as well, namely for blood transfusions and heart transplants. Further, it was
observed when respondents considered transplants both to their infants as well as them-
selves, suggesting that responses were not driven by expectations of a “transplant
placebo” effect, whereby people would predict that knowing about the transplant would
be the cause of any changes in the recipient.
It is important to note that obtaining evidence for essentialism required that respon-
dents actively reject formal knowledge about the function of bodily elements. Thus, it is
very likely that the survey was a highly conservative measure of the pervasiveness and
strength of the essentialist phenomenon. Indeed, average scores on the Essentialist mea-
sure were typically low (i.e., always under “3”). However, the effect size obtained for
donor type (g2p = 0.15) was large (Kinnear & Gray, 2004) and suggests that people were
highly consistent in reporting essentialist effects for non-similar-to-self donors. Further-
more, respondents engaged in essentialist reasoning about all the different categories
under consideration, including social categories as well as non-human species. Individual
Table 7
Proportion of respondents providing target open-ended explanation types for Study 1 (American respondents)
and Study 2 (Indian respondents)a
Donor Type
Explanation Type
Safety/
Health Morality
Creeped
Out/Reputation
Category
Label Essentialist
Denial of
Essentialism
Unclear/
Other
American respondents
Similar-to-self 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.94
Different-from-self 0.63 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.80
Positive 0.60 0.29 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.17 0.73
Negative 0.66 0.17 0.29 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.81
Cross-species 0.56 0.05 0.26 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.79
Indian respondents
Similar-to-self 0.22 0.07 0.04 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.99
Different-from-self 0.31 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.08 0.96
Positive 0.25 0.49 0.04 0.10 0.45 0.16 0.83
Negative 0.38 0.48 0.16 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.89
Cross-species 0.30 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.90
Note. aAs each donor type included two donors, and because each respondent provided explanations for
both self-as-recipient and infant-as-recipient, the proportion of respondents providing the different styles of
explanations do not add to 1.0 across rows.
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response patterns on the Essentialist composite measure further indicated the strength and
pervasiveness of the effect; respondents were significantly more likely to provide scores
for non-similar-to-self types that were higher than similar-to-self types (vs. lower), adding
more support to the claim that essentialist reasoning was often used when considering
transplants from other individuals. As well, respondents’ open-ended explanations also
frequently invoked essentialist explanations (particularly for human donors differing from
self). Finally, we also found that respondents engaged in non-essentialist styles of reason-
ing when considering the various donor types, reporting concerns about contamination
and/or reputation change post-transplant. As with essentialist reasoning, non-essentialist
reasoning was seen for considerations of transplants to both the respondents themselves
and their infants, across a range of transplant types, and for donors that were both human
and non-human.
3. Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated essentialist thinking about transfer of internal bodily elements in
a sample of Americans. Although these data are indicative of systematically held lay
beliefs that transplants can have causal effects, left unanswered is whether these findings
would be observed in both countries, or if these patterns of reasoning are particular to a
Western sample. In Study 2, we expanded the focus of our study by targeting respondents
in India so as to investigate possible cultural similarities and differences in essentialist
(and non-essentialist) beliefs about transplants. India is an especially interesting country
to examine because it differs from the United States on a number of dimensions that may
affect how transplants are conceptualized. For instance, Hindu Indians typically are more
concerned with contamination than Westerners—a difference that has been attributed to a
high degree of concern with maintaining purity, and a belief that it can be threatened by
indirect as well as direct interpersonal contact (e.g., Hejmadi, Rozin, & Siegal, 2004).
Such concerns are prominently featured in dietary laws and customs that regulate what
foods may be eaten (Olivelle, 1995), as well as rules regarding the caste system—
reflected, for instance, by traditional restrictions of contact or association with the
“untouchable” caste (Narula, 1999). In light of such pervasive contamination concerns, it
is plausible that when thinking about bodily transplants, contamination-based reasoning
(indicated by the Non-Essentialist measure) might predominate or even be employed to
the exclusion of causal-essentialist reasoning.
Further, there are sociocultural differences in the regulation of organ transplants that
might also contribute to Indians showing stronger contamination concerns. Until 1995,
paying donors for organs was legal in India, and commercial transplants were character-
ized by poor oversight and improper screening of donors, in numerous cases resulting in
the transmission of serious viruses such as HIV and hepatitis (Salahudeen et al., 1990).
Although the practice was ultimately banned, paying for organs is still a relatively com-
mon practice in some areas of the country, with donations often coming from marginal-
ized or impoverished individuals, reportedly often under duress (Jha, 2004; Kalbag,
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2008). In contrast, commercial transplants in the United States have been illegal on the
national level since 1984, and laws regulating organ transplants have been more strictly
enforced, with infractions occurring very rarely (Panjabi, 2011). In light of this, we
predicted that Indians would report higher levels of discomfort with organ transplants,
particularly from the “negative” donor type, either because these types are seen as victim-
ized (leading to feelings of guilt), or because they are seen as more unclean (leading to
feelings of contamination). It is therefore likely that such feelings would contribute to
higher scores on both of the measures of non-essentialist reasoning, namely the “creeped
out/contaminated” and “reputation” items.
Thus, given Indians’ predicted heightened focus on contamination, as well as specific
sociocultural factors surrounding how organ transplants have been regulated and con-
ducted, one might expect an exclusive focus on non-essentialist explanations in an Indian
sample. On the other hand, it is also plausible that evidence for essentialism would still
be found among the Indian respondents, largely replicating the findings from the Ameri-
can sample. As discussed earlier, non-essentialist explanations can be entertained inde-
pendent of essentialist explanations, meaning that it is entirely possible that respondents
would engage in both styles of reasoning simultaneously. As well, ample literature sug-
gests that essentialist thinking is found across varied cultures (Atran, 1990, 1998; Atran
& Medin, 2008; Gil-White, 2001; Hirschfeld, 1996, 2001; Waxman, Medin, & Ross,
2007), including Indian cultures (Mahalingam, 2003; Mahalingam, Haritatos, & Jackson,
2007). Given that essentialism in other domains has been found to be so widespread, we
predicted that essentialist thinking about organ transplants would also be found cross-cul-
turally, and thus would be detectable among Indians as well as Americans.
To assess this prediction, we employed the same survey and analyses that were used
with Americans. Again, we were interested in examining the degree to which essentialist
and non-essentialist styles of reasoning were employed when considering different poten-
tial donors.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Respondents (n = 140) were obtained using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We offered
the survey only to individuals in India and compensated each respondent $1.85 for suc-
cessful completion. Demographic information from these respondents is displayed in
Table 2. Sixty-eight additional respondents provided data that were discarded due to
incorrect answers to the attention-check questions. The proportion of respondents failing
attention-check questions was much higher in this sample than in the American sample.
This is likely due to the higher proportion of individuals in India using Mechanical Turk
as a primary source of income rather than a secondary or tertiary source, as is common
in the United States (Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010); this differ-
ence likely increases volume but decreases quality across respondents. Whatever the
cause for the discrepancy, answering both attention-check questions correctly by chance
would be predicted only 2% of the time, and thus answers from retained individuals are
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highly likely to be from engaged individuals with proficient English. Additionally, we
discarded data from five pairs of surveys that had duplicate IP addresses within each pair,
as this indicates a likelihood that these surveys were taken by the same individual twice.
3.1.2. Survey materials and scoring
The survey and scoring were identical to that given to American respondents in Study 1.
Respondents answered questions about each type of transplant or transfusion; the number
of respondents answering questions about heart transplants was higher (n = 56) than the
other two transplant types (blood n = 44, DNA n = 40). Within each transplant type,
approximately half responded to questions about an infant as recipient first, and the other
half responded to questions about the self as recipient first (cell sizes ranged from n = 18
to n = 24 in the non-heart conditions; in the heart condition, n = 25 [infant first] and
n = 31 [self first]).
3.2. Results
Analyses exploring the predicted main effects of donor type and transplant type on
rank-ordered preferences, Likert-scale liking ratings, Essentialist scores, and Non-Essen-
tialist scores were identical to those used for the American respondents in Study 1,
namely non-parametric analyses of rank-ordered preferences and ANOVAs for the remain-
ing measures featuring a 3 (transplant type: blood, DNA, heart) 9 5 (donor type: similar-
to-self, different, positive, negative, cross-species) design. As with American respondents,
the infant versus self as recipient variable and respondent gender did not participate in
any interactions that reversed any significant main effects of donor or transplant type.
Thus, we collapsed across these variables for the final analyses.
3.2.1. Liking data: Rank-ordered preferences and Likert-scale ratings
Rank-ordered preferences. Rankings significantly differed from each other, Friedman’s
v2(4) = 398.94, p < .001. Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests between similar-to-self and all
other donor types revealed that rankings for similar-to-self and positive types did not
differ (Z = 0.68, p > .05), but similar-to-self types were significantly preferred over all
other donor types (different-from-self: Z = 9.72, negative: Z = 9.17, cross-species:
Z = 10.12, all ps < .001).
Likert-scale ratings. The ANOVA (see Study 1 Results overview) revealed a main effect
of donor type on liking ratings, F(4, 548) = 372.16, p < .001, g2p = 0.73. Scores for simi-
lar-to-self types and positive types were not significantly different; however, transplants
from similar-to-self types were liked significantly more than from the other three types
(different-from-self, negative, and cross-species), a pattern consistent with that seen in the
preference rankings (Table 4). There was also a main effect of transplant type,
F(2, 137) = 4.08, p = .02, g2p = 0.06. Tukey post-hoc tests indicated that DNA donations
were liked less (M = 4.14, SD = 1.67) than heart transplants (M = 4.63, SD = 1.30),
p = .02, whereas blood transfusions (M = 4.52, SD = 1.54) were intermediate and not
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different from the other two, ps > .05. Finally, these main effects were qualified by a
donor type 9 transplant type interaction, F(8, 548) = 5.07, p < .001, g2p = 0.07. As our
main prediction centered on the main effect of donor type, to examine the nature of this
interaction we again compared all other donor types against similar-to-self types within
each transplant type. Importantly, comparisons of similar-to-self against all other types
within each transplant type revealed the same overall pattern described for the main
effect of donor type, with the single exception that transplants from similar-to-self types
were significantly more liked than transplants from positive types in the blood condition
(t(43) = 3.62, p = .001; whereas they were not differentiated in the overall main effect).
3.2.2. Essentialist composite measure
The ANOVA (see Study 1 Results overview) revealed a main effect of donor type on the
Essentialist composite measure, F(4, 548) = 44.49, p < .001, g2p = 0.25. Paired compari-
sons of similar-to-self (baseline) types against all other types revealed that transplants
from similar-to-self types had significantly lower scores than all other donor types
(Table 4), indicating that Indian respondents endorsed essentialist reasoning. There was
also a main effect of transplant type, F(2, 137) = 4.25, p = .02, g2p = 0.06, with Tukey
post-hoc comparisons indicating that DNA transplants (M = 3.29, SD = 2.21) received
higher scores than blood transfusions (M = 2.52, SD = 2.11), p = .03, and heart
transplants (M = 2.72, SD = 1.87), p = .04. There were no other main effects or inter-
actions; most important, there was no interaction between donor type and transplant type,
indicating that the main effect of donor type indicative of essentialism was not restricted
to DNA. Thus, there was clear evidence for essentialist reasoning in Indian respondents,
which was especially strongly (but not exclusively) observed for beliefs about DNA trans-
plants.
As in Study 1, we also examined scores on the Personality/Behavior item considered
separately (a more canonical measure of essentialism) to determine if patterns were
similar on this item to patterns on the composite Essentialist measure. The results were
largely replicated, with findings indicating (a) a main effect of donor type
(F(4, 548) = 16.40, p < .001, g2p = 0.16) with paired comparisons indicating that scores
for similar-to-self types were lower than for all other donor types and (b) a main effect
of transplant type (F(1, 137) = 9.70, p < .001, g2p = 0.12) with post-hoc Tukey compari-
sons indicating that scores for DNA were higher than for both heart and blood (ps < .01),
whereas heart and blood did not differ from each other. However, unlike results for the
Essentialist composite score, there was a significant donor type 9 transplant type interac-
tion, F(4, 548) = 2.63, p = .03, g2p = 0.04. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that scores on
similar-to-self were not significantly different from either different-from-self (p = .12) or
negative (p = .10) donor types within heart transplants. All other comparisons, however,
were significant, with similar-to-self receiving lower scores. Thus, aside from a slight
attenuation of the main effect of donor type within heart transplants, results were
consistent with the primary analysis of the composite essentialism item; most important,
patterns consistent with essentialist thinking were shown for a variety of donor types and
across a range of transplant types.
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Individual response patterns. The distribution of responses on the Essentialist measure
are presented in Table 5, again (as with Americans) focusing on comparisons between
similar-to-self and all other donor types. Responses consistent with essentialism were seen
for all non-similar-to-self donor types, with individuals’ scores consistent with essential-
ism (i.e., higher relative to similar-to-self) ranging from almost 44% (for different-from-
self types) to 70% (for cross-species types). Binomial tests comparing the number of
individuals reporting higher scores on non-similar-to-self types versus the number of indi-
viduals reporting lower scores on non-similar-to-self types were significant for all four
donor types, ps < .001.
3.2.3. Test of minimalism: Category change and essentialist reasoning
People’s responses to the essentialist questions relative to responses on the category
change questions were again compared to assess the claims of the unmediated minimalist
approach. Scores on the Essentialist measure were compared for cross-species and simi-
lar-to-self donor types using data only from respondents who had uniformly rejected the
idea of a transplant causing a change in category membership (n = 74; the same analysis
used for Americans). There was a main effect of donor type, F(1, 71) = 24.47, p < .001,
g2p = 0.26, with scores for cross-species types higher (M = 3.07, SD = 1.81) than for sim-
ilar-to-self types (M = 2.10, SD = 1.29). There were no other main effects or interactions.
Indian respondents therefore showed essentialist reasoning regarding cross-species trans-
plants even when they did not expect the transplant to exert any change whatsoever in
the recipient’s category membership.
3.2.4. Non-Essentialist composite measure
The ANOVA (see Study 1 Results overview) revealed a main effect of donor type on
the Non-Essentialist measure, F(4, 548) = 201.94, p < .001, g2p = 0.60. Paired compari-
sons of similar-to-self (baseline) types against all other types showed that similar
types received significantly lower scores than all other types (Table 4). There was also
a main effect of transplant type, F(2, 137) = 4.21, p = .02, g2p = 0.06. Tukey post-hoc
comparisons indicated that DNA transplants (M = 3.76, SD = 2.16) received higher
scores than both blood transfusions (M = 3.12, SD = 2.04), p = .04, and heart trans-
plants (M = 3.14, SD = 1.80), p = .02. Finally, there was a significant donor
type 9 transplant type interaction, F(8, 548) = 3.80, p < .001, g2p = 0.05. Because our
main prediction centered on the main effect of donor type, to examine the nature of
this interaction, we again compared all other donor types against similar-to-self types
within each transplant type. The pattern of results was largely the same as the overall
main effect, with the exception that for heart transplants, scores for similar-to-self
types were no longer different from positive types (t(55) = 1.65, p = .11) or different-
from-self types (t(55) = 1.61, p = .11). Thus, on the whole, there was still strong
evidence for non-essentialist reasoning in Indian respondents for a wide range of
donor types, with only slight attenuation of this effect observed within heart transplant
scenarios.
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3.2.5. Open-ended explanations
Coding of open-ended explanations was identical to the procedure used for American
responses. Agreement between two coders on 20% of the responses ranged from good
to excellent, with Cohen’s kappa ranging from 0.67 to 0.81 (average j = 0.74). As
with Americans, concerns with safety and health (as well as unclear or other types of
explanations) predominated, but essentialist explanations were observed as well, and in
fact were more commonly seen in Indians’ responses (52.14% of Indians gave at least
one essentialist explanation across all their responses, compared to about a third of
Americans). Appeals to the morality of the donor were also notably prominent
(Table 7).
3.3. Discussion
Patterns of preferences and liking were remarkably similar to those seen in Americans.
In particular, similar-to-self donor types were typically preferred over other types of
donors (different-from-self, negative, and cross-species types), though for Indian respon-
dents, this difference was not significant when considering positive types. Evidence for
essentialist thinking similar to that of Americans was also revealed in the Indian sample.
Respondents endorsed the possibility of outward characteristics (personality/behavior or
luck) changing upon receiving the transplant to become more like those of the donor.
This pattern of reasoning was seen both for human donor types who differed from the
recipient as well as cross-species donor types, indicating that, as with Americans, essen-
tialist construals of transplants extended beyond other species to other types of people.
Finally, Indians also indicated non-essentialist concerns with transplants, reporting they
would feel contaminated and/or fear social disapproval if they were to receive transplants
from non-similar-to-self types. Taken together, the data indicate that the Indian sample
entertained both causal and non-causal styles of explanations when reasoning about trans-
plants from other individuals.
4. Study 3
In both Study 1 (with Americans) and Study 2 (with Indians), respondents provided
higher scores on the Essentialist measure for all other donor types relative to donors simi-
lar to themselves. We interpret this pattern as constituting evidence for essentialist rea-
soning about transplants, because it suggests that people expect transplants to transfer
aspects of a donor to a recipient. Alternatively, however, the data may reflect a broader
magical thinking style, in which individuals expect that any kind of transfer from one
person to another has the capacity to transfer aspects of the original owner to the new
owner. Although this would be a noteworthy finding in its own right, this would not sug-
gest that respondents represented essence as exclusively internal, bodily, and transferable,
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but rather that transplants are one of many ways in which the transfer of anything at all
can confer traits of a donor on a recipient.
To address this alternative explanation, we created a control study in which respon-
dents (both American and Indian) were asked to consider receiving money rather than a
transplant from the various donor types. Money was described as being transferred from
the donor’s account to the recipient’s account, again without any direct personal interac-
tion. In light of our original hypothesis—namely that Studies 1 and 2 reflected people’s
tendency to represent essence as a causal force within the body—we predicted the
absence of essentialist thinking in the money transfer scenario.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Respondents were obtained using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (American n = 34;
Indian n = 29). The number of respondents was approximately equal to that of each
of the bodily transplants in the prior studies. We offered the survey only to individu-
als in the United States (for the American sample) and India (for the Indian sample)
and compensated each respondent $1.85 for successful completion. Data from two
additional American respondents and 17 additional Indian respondents were discarded
due to incorrect answers to the attention-check questions. Additionally, we discarded
data from the Indian sample from nine surveys that had duplicate IP addresses, as this
indicates a likelihood that these surveys were taken by the same individual more than
once.
4.1.2. Survey materials and scoring
Surveys opened with a vignette describing a money donation. The donation was
described as helping to pay for an expensive and necessary medical treatment, an aspect
that allowed the necessity and urgency of the donation to be roughly equivalent to that
of the transplant scenarios. The amount of money was specified as $2,000 for the Amer-
ican sample and 100,000 rupees for the Indian sample; amounts were approximately
equal based on the dollar-to-rupee exchange rate the month the study was run. The
remaining content of the survey was otherwise identical to that of Studies 1 and 2
except that animal donor types were excluded, as animals obviously do not possess
money and thus could not serve as potential donors. (In addition because animals were
excluded, no category change questions were asked, as these had originally been pro-
vided only for the animal donor types.) The eight human donors were again classified
into the same similar-to-self, different-from-self, positive, and negative donor types.
Approximately, half of the respondents within each country sample (American and
Indian) responded to questions about an infant as recipient first, and the other half
responded to questions about the self as recipient first (cell sizes ranged from n = 14 to
n = 17). Scoring and calculation of the Essentialist and Non-Essentialist measures were
identical to Studies 1 and 2. Exact wording of money transfer vignettes appears in
Appendix A.
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4.2. Results
4.2.1. Overview
Infant- versus self-as-recipient and gender of respondent did not participate in any
interactions that reversed any donor type main effects found in preliminary analyses.
They were thus removed from the primary reported analyses. As in Studies 1 and 2, pref-
erence rankings were analyzed by a non-parametric Friedman’s test, and American and
Indian samples were analyzed separately. Likert-scale measures (Liking ratings, Essential-
ist scores, and Non-Essentialist scores) were analyzed in separate one-way within-subjects
ANOVAs examining the factor of donor type (similar-to-self, different-from-self, positive,
and negative). A final analysis compared essentialist beliefs across Studies 1, 2, and 3,
thereby making comparisons based on country (United States vs. India) as well as trans-
plant type (bodily vs. non-bodily money control).
4.2.2. Liking data: Rank-ordered preferences and Likert-scale ratings
Rank-ordered preferences. For Americans, rankings significantly differed from each
other, Friedman’s v2(3) = 80.41, p < .001. Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests between similar-
to-self and all other donor types revealed that rankings for similar-to-self and positive
types did not differ (Z = 0.41, p > .05), but similar-to-self types were significantly pre-
ferred over the other two donor types (different-from-self: Z = 4.46, negative: Z = 5.10,
both ps < .001). For Indians, rankings also significantly differed from each other, Fried-
man’s v2(3) = 67.33, p < .001. Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests between similar-to-self and
all other donor types indicated that rankings for similar-to-self and positive types again
did not differ (Z = 0.93, p > .05), but similar-to-self types were significantly preferred
over the other two donor types (different: Z = 4.63, negative: Z = 4.51, both ps < .001).
Americans and Indians thus showed the same pattern, significantly preferring similar-to-
self donor types over different and negative types, but not differentiating between simi-
lar-to-self and positive donor types.
Likert-scale ratings. For Americans, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of donor type on
liking ratings, F(3, 99) = 90.86, p < .001, g2p = 0.73. Scores for positive and similar-to-
self types were not differentiated; however, donations from similar-to-self types were
liked significantly more than those from the other two types (different-from-self and neg-
ative; Table 8). An identical pattern was seen in the Indian sample; there was a main
effect of donor type on liking ratings, F(3, 84) = 109.50, p < .001, g2p = 0.80, with scores
for positive and similar-to-self types not differentiated, and donations from similar-to-self
types liked significantly more than those from the other two types (different-from-self
and negative; Table 8), a pattern consistent with that observed in the preference rankings.
4.2.3. Essentialist composite measure
For Americans, there was no significant main effect of donor type on the Essentialist
measure, F(3, 99) = 1.71, p = .17. We nevertheless conducted paired comparisons of
similar-to-self (baseline) types against all other types, which revealed that scores for
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similar-to-self types were not significantly different from either positive or negative types,
and in fact were significantly higher than different-from-self types (the opposite direction
of that obtained in Study 1; Table 8). A similar nonsignificant effect was seen for donor
type in Indians as well, F(3, 84) = 1.13, p = .34. We similarly conducted paired compari-
sons of similar-to-self types against the other three types, which showed that scores for
similar-to-self types did not differ from any other type (Table 8). Thus, the prediction
that money donations would not result in causal-essentialist thinking was supported.
Examination of Personality/Behavior scores alone (the more canonical measure of
essentialism) similarly did not reveal evidence of essentialist reasoning about money.
Unlike the analysis of the composite Essentialist measure, there was a main effect for
donor type in the American sample, F(3, 99) = 6.35, p = .001, g2p = 0.16. However,
t-tests comparing similar-to-self baseline types to all other donor types indicated that sim-
ilar-to-self types received significantly higher scores than different-from-self and negative
donor types, again the opposite direction of that obtained in Study 1, and inconsistent
with essentialist reasoning about money. There was no main effect of donor in the Indian
sample, F(3, 84) = 1.01, p = .39.
Individual response patterns. Examination of the distribution of responses on the
Essentialist measure further indicate that money donations were not essentialized. Distri-
butions are presented in Table 9, again focusing on comparisons between similar-to-self
and all other donor types (as was done in Studies 1 and 2). Binomial tests comparing the
number of individuals reporting higher scores on non-similar-to-self types (a pattern
indicative of essentialism) versus the number of individuals reporting lower scores on
non-similar-to-self types (a pattern indicating lack of essentialism) were largely nonsignif-
icant, ps > .05, with the single exception that significantly more Americans provided
Table 8
Liking, Essentialist, and Non-Essentialist scores by donor type for Study 3 (money transfer control)
Donor Type
Measure
Liking Essentialist Non-Essentialist
M SD ta Sig.b M SD ta Sig.b M SD ta Sig.b
American respondents
Similar-to-self (baseline) 6.21 1.12 – 1.80 1.39 – – 1.09 0.88
Different-from-self 5.73 1.18 2.96 * 1.54 1.10 2.13 * 1.15 0.86 0.68 ns
Positive 6.28 0.80 0.57 ns 1.87 1.34 0.52 ns 1.18 0.77 0.80 ns
Negative 2.96 1.54 10.19 ** 1.77 1.40 0.15 ns 2.65 1.51 7.27 **
Indian respondents
Similar-to-self (baseline) 6.04 0.92 – 2.51 1.75 – – 2.24 1.36
Different-from-self 5.07 1.02 4.55 ** 2.27 1.42 1.16 ns 2.34 1.31 0.55 ns
Positive 6.04 0.72 0.00 ns 2.53 1.57 0.16 ns 2.16 1.32 0.79 ns
Negative 2.27 1.24 13.47 ** 2.59 1.51 0.31 ns 3.46 1.26 4.22 **
Notes: aPairwise comparisons were always against scores for similar-to-self (baseline) donor types; Ameri-
can df = 33, Indian df = 28.
b*p < .05; **p < .01.
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lower scores for different-from-self types (p < .01), which is opposite to the pattern
obtained in Study 1 and inconsistent with essentialist reasoning on this control task.
4.2.4. Non-Essentialist composite measure
For Americans, there was a main effect of donor type on the Non-Essentialist measure,
F(3, 99) = 47.57, p < .001, g2p = 0.59. Paired comparisons of similar-to-self (baseline)
types against all other types showed that similar-to-self types were not differentiated from
positive or different-from-self types but received significantly lower scores than negative
types (Table 8). A similar pattern of results was seen in Indians; there was a main effect
of donor type, F(3, 84) = 14.43, p < .001, g2p = 0.34, with paired comparisons indicating
that similar-to-self types again were not differentiated from either positive or different-
from-self types but received significantly lower scores than negative types (Table 8).
These patterns are different from those obtained in Studies 1 and 2, in which similar-
to-self donor types were differentiated from all other donor types.
4.2.5. Open-ended explanations
A primary coder assessed respondents’ explanations for essentialist predictions, as the
main question motivating this study was whether respondents would expect money dona-
tions to be essentialized. An independent coder coded 20% of responses. Agreement was
perfect (j = 1.0). Only two open-ended responses showed evidence of essentialism (one
from negative types, in an Indian respondent, and one from positive types, in an Ameri-
can respondent), accounting for <1% of responses.
4.2.6. Essentialism across countries and transplant types
Data treatment. Compared with American respondents, Indian respondents gave overall
higher values for all questions contributing to the composite essentialism and non-essen-
tialism measures (ps < .01); furthermore, scores specifically for baseline similar-to-self
donors were also higher for Indian respondents (ps < .01), suggesting a non-equivalence
in baseline scores between countries. This pattern is consistent with prior observations of
Table 9
Respondents providing each of three response patterns on essentialist measure in Study 3
Response Pattern
Donor Type
Different-From-Self Positive Negative
American respondents
Essentialism score lower than similar-to-self 0.47 0.24 0.35
Essentialism score equal to similar-to-self 0.44 0.44 0.38
Essentialism score higher than similar-to-self 0.09 0.32 0.26
Indian respondents
Essentialism score lower than similar-to-self 0.38 0.28 0.38
Essentialism score equal to similar-to-self 0.28 0.34 0.21
Essentialism score higher than similar-to-self 0.34 0.38 0.41
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overall higher agreement (irrespective of question type) on the part of Indian versus
American online participants (Schulze, Seedorf, Geiger, Kaufmann, & Schader, 2011) and
prevented meaningful direct comparisons of scores across the two samples. Thus, to cor-
rect for this difference, we calculated scores for each participant reflecting the difference
between the non-similar-to-self donor essentialism scores relative to the similar-to-self
baseline essentialism scores. Note that these scores involve the essentialism composite
measure only, and not any of the other measures (Liking or Non-Essentialist scores).
These difference-from-baseline (DFB) scores were analyzed using a country (United
States vs. India) 9 donor type (positive, different, negative) 9 transplant condition (bod-
ily vs. non-bodily money control) ANOVA. (Species donor types were not included in this
analysis, as no species donors were provided for the money control condition.)
Analysis. Notably, there was a main effect for transplant condition, F(1, 303) = 9.97,
p = .002, g2p = 0.03, with DFB scores for bodily transplants higher (M = .29, SD = .77)
than for non-bodily money donations (M = .06, SD = .84); this is consistent with the
idea that bodily transplants but not money would be essentialized. There was also a sig-
nificant main effect for donor, F(2, 606) = 13.88, p < .01, g2p = 0.04. Tukey post-hoc
comparison indicated that positive DFB scores (M = 0.33, SD = 0.87) and negative DFB
scores (M = 0.26, SD = 1.03) were both significantly higher than different DFB scores
(M = 0.08, SD = .83, ps < .01) but were not different from each other, p = .14. This
result suggests that positive and negative donor types were essentialized more than differ-
ent-from-self types (but recall from analyses performed for each country separately in
Studies 1 and 2 that all three types were essentialized to some degree, evidenced by all
three types receiving significantly higher scores than the similar-to-self baseline). There
were no other main effects or interactions; most notably, country did not participate in
any significant effects.
Finally, because cross-species donors were not included in the money control and thus
were excluded from the prior analysis, we also compared the two countries in essentializ-
ing cross-species donors within the bodily transplant conditions alone. Again, the analyses
involved the essentialism composite measure only. Indian respondents’ DFB scores were
significantly higher (M = 1.16, SD = 1.57) than American respondents’ (M = 0.68,
SD = 1.26), t(242) = 2.56, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.34.
4.3. Discussion
In Studies 1 and 2, we argued that people’s endorsement of non-similar-to-self donors
transferring characteristics to recipients through transplants reflected psychological essen-
tialism. Study 3 was designed to rule out an alternative explanation for these findings,
namely that respondents in Studies 1 and 2 may have been relying on a broader magical
belief that any kind of transfer, not just internal bodily elements, might confer donors’
traits on recipients. Study 3 served as a control to rule out this possibility by asking
respondents to consider a money donation rather than a transplant. Both Americans and
Indians did not expect money transfer to result in the recipient taking on characteristics
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of the donor, as indicated by scores on the Essentialism measure for non-similar-to-self
types being largely equivalent to scores for similar-to-self types. Respondents instead
endorsed causal-essentialist effects (transfer of personality/behavior and/or luck) only
when considering transfer of internal body parts (Studies 1 and 2), not merely any kind
of transfer (such as money). Overall, Study 3 strengthens our claim that Studies 1 and 2
were indicative of genuine essentialist thinking on the part of both Americans and
Indians.
Analysis of DFB scores provides further evidence for the claim that bodily transplants
are uniquely essentialized. Specifically, DFB scores were higher for bodily transplants
than for non-bodily monetary transfer, consistent with the belief that bodily donations,
but not monetary donations, may confer donors’ characteristics to recipients. Thus, results
from this analysis again indicate that in both countries, respondents differentiated the
causal implications of receiving bodily versus non-bodily donations; the former was
essentialized, whereas the latter was not. Notably, U.S.-India differences were typically
not observed when examining DFB scores in the analysis of Studies 1, 2, and 3; the sole
exception to this was that Indian respondents essentialized cross-species donors more than
Americans.
5. Study 4
Results across the first three studies indicate that internal bodily elements, but not
monetary donations, are seen as possessing a causal force that can be transferred via
organ transplants. Although this strongly suggests that internal bodily elements are
uniquely essentialized, monetary donations differ from bodily transplants in a number of
ways that raise questions as to exactly which characteristics are necessary for something
to be essentialized. Money is both external and acquired, typically on a temporary basis,
and thus differs from a heart, blood, or DNA, each of which is an internal and inherent
or biologically endowed part of someone’s body. Must an element be both internal and
biological for it to be seen as capable of transferring causal essence?
We designed Study 4 to investigate whether the internal versus external and biological
versus acquired dimensions are relevant when making essentialist predictions. We com-
pared individuals’ responses to questions regarding three types of transfers: (a) a heart
transplant, similar to that described in the prior studies, in which the donated element
was thus both internal and biological; (b) a pacemaker exchange, in which the pacemaker
from one individual was described as being put into the recipient’s body and was thus an
internal but acquired non-biological element; and (c) a skin graft, in which a portion of
an individual’s skin was described as being grafted onto the recipient and was thus an
external but biological element.
As in Studies 1–3, we examined individuals in both the United States and India to
compare patterns of essentializing along this dimension. Given that Studies 1–3 had
already established that individuals essentialize the heart using similar-to-self donors as a
baseline, we did not assess similar-to-self donors in Study 4. Instead, we expanded the
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range of possible donors within positive and negative types, with the plan of comparing
essentializing across the three donor conditions (heart, transplant, and skin graft).
We also modified the survey structure relative to Studies 1–3 in two ways. First, we
asked respondents about donations to themselves only, rather than to both themselves and
their infants, because the infant versus self dimension did not participate in any effects of
theoretical interest in the prior studies. Second, we shortened the survey by including
only a Likert-scale liking item, an open-ended explanation/justification item, a single
essentialism question, and a single non-essentialism question. The liking item and open-
ended explanation request were identical to those in Studies 1–3 (Table 3). To provide
respondents with a broader range of options for the essentialism and non-essentialism
questions, we asked respondents for a percentage rather than a score on a 1–7 Likert
scale. This change allowed for finer-grained analysis of the presence of these constructs.
The question assessing essentialism was modeled after the Personality/Behavior item
from Studies 1–3 and asked, “How possible is it that your personality/behavior might
change to become more like that of this donor because of the graft? Please provide a
value ranging from 0% to 100%, where 0% indicates this is completely impossible and
100% indicates this is completely possible.” The non-essentialism question was modeled
after the Creeped Out/Contaminated item from Studies 1–3 and asked, “How ‘creeped
out’ or ‘contaminated’ would you feel if you received your graft from this donor? Please
provide a value ranging from 0% to 100%, where 0% indicates you would not feel at all
creeped out or contaminated and 100% indicates you would feel completely creeped out
or contaminated.”
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
Respondents were obtained using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (American n = 136,
Indian n = 253).2 We offered the survey to individuals in the United States (for the
American sample) and India (for the Indian sample) and compensated each respondent
$1.49 for successful completion. Data from 14 additional American respondents and 91
additional Indian respondents were discarded due to incorrect answers to the attention-
check questions. Additionally, we discarded data from eight surveys with duplicate IP
addresses from the American sample, and from 31 surveys that had duplicate IP
addresses from the Indian sample. Finally, respondents with average essentialism scores
greater than three standard deviations outside their respective condition means (within
each country) were removed from analysis. This excluded three American participants
(one each from the heart, pacemaker, and skin graft conditions); no Indian respondents
had outlying data.
5.1.2. Survey materials
Respondents read descriptions about one of three transfers: heart transplant (American
n = 49; Indian n = 82), pacemaker exchange (American n = 47, Indian n = 87), or skin
graft (American n = 40, Indian n = 84). Each respondent answered questions about a
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total of 12 donors, with six positive and six negative donors (Table 1). Text of the vign-
ettes describing the transfers appears in Appendix A.
Respondents saw four questions about each donor. The liking item and open-ended
explanation request appeared first, followed by the Personality/Behavior and Creeped
Out/Contaminated items in counterbalanced order. Additionally, approximately half the
participants saw one randomly determined order of donors, whereas the other half saw
this order reversed. Order of Personality/Behavior and Creeped Out/Contaminated and
donor order were crossed, and cell sizes within the four versions created by this crossing
were approximately equal (American: heart n = 11–14, pacemaker n = 11–13, skin graft
n = 9–11; Indian: heart n = 18–23, pacemaker n = 19–28, skin graft n = 19–23).
5.2. Results
For the sake of brevity, we focus solely on analyses of the Personality/Behavior and
Creeped Out/Contaminated questions. For each question, a mixed-factorial 3 (transfer
type: heart, pacemaker, skin graft) 9 2 (donor type: positive vs. negative) ANOVA was
used, with transfer type as a between-subjects variable and donor type as a within-sub-
jects variable. As in Studies 1–3, scores from Indian respondents on the essentialism item
were substantially higher for the overall average relative to Americans (ps < .01).
Although this may genuinely reflect greater endorsement of essentialism, it is also possi-
ble that the difference reflects the same general tendency to provide higher values seen in
Indian respondents relative to American respondents in Studies 1–3. This possibility
prevented direct comparison between countries; thus, analyses for the two groups were
performed separately.
American sample. For the Personality/Behavior item, there was a main effect of
transfer type, indicative of differences in essentializing according to transfer condition,
F (2, 133) = 4.83, p = .01, g2p = 07. Tukey post-hoc comparisons indicated that a heart
transplant was judged more likely to transfer personality or behavior than either a pace-
maker exchange or a skin graft, ps < .03; scores for pacemaker exchange and skin graft
did not differ, however (p > .05; Table 10). Finally, the donor type 9 transfer condition
interaction was not significant, p > .05. There was also a main effect of donor, F(1,
133) = 5.93, p = .02, g2p = 0.04, whereby respondents reported that positive donors would
be more likely to transfer personality or behavior (M = 6.87%, SD = 13.91) than negative
donors (M = 3.83%, SD = 7.93).
For the Creeped Out/Contaminated item, there was a main effect of donor,
F(1, 133) = 61.36, p < .001, = .32, whereby respondents indicated they would feel more
creeped out or contaminated by donations from negative donors (M = 28.03%,
SD = 27.86) than positive donors (M = 14.28%, SD = 26.63). No other main effects or
interactions were significant, ps > .05 (see Table 10 for means according to transfer type
condition).
Indian sample. For the Personality/Behavior item, there was a main effect of donor,
F(1, 250) = 4.18, p = .04, g2p = 0.02, whereby respondents reported that positive donors
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would be more likely to transfer personality or behavior (M = 25.62%, SD = 28.88) than
negative donors (M = 22.61%, SD = 25.32). No other main effects or interactions were
significant, p > .05; most notably, this included no main effect for transfer type condition
(see Table 10 for means), indicating no difference in endorsement of essentialism
depending on the three types of transfers.
For the Creeped Out/Contaminated item, there was a main effect of donor,
F(1, 250) = 57.20, p < .001, g2p = 0.19, whereby respondents indicated they would feel
more creeped out or contaminated by donations from negative donors (M = 33.38%,
SD = 28.43) than positive donors (M = 19.99%, SD = 25.77). No other main effects or
interactions were significant, ps > .05 (see Table 10 for means according to transfer type
condition).
6. General discussion
A significant body of work suggests that psychological essentialism contributes power-
fully to the ways that we think about category structure, license and constrain inductive
inference, and make judgments about the causes of outward behaviors and features of
social, natural, and other kinds (Gelman, 2003; Medin, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989).
The current studies assessed whether essentialist beliefs also affect people’s reasoning
about bodies and transfers of internal bodily elements, in particular whether people
believe that receiving a transplant can cause a recipient to take on characteristics of the
donor. Psychological essentialism predicts this pattern of belief, because internal parts are
taken to be suffused with essence. Thus, when an internal part is transferred from one
individual to another, some of the donor’s essence is also transferred and so will have a
casual influence on the recipient. These studies constitute the first systematic, direct
investigation of these essentialist beliefs in the general public. We found clear evidence
for essentialist thinking: Respondents frequently endorsed the possibility of organ
Table 10
Essentialist and Non-Essentialist scores by transfer type for Study 4
Transfer Type
Measure
Essentialist Non-Essentialist
M (%) SD M (%) SD
American respondents
Heart 8.44 13.55 18.38 19.40
Pacemaker 3.01* 7.75 23.16 29.61
Graft 2.95* 5.66 21.92 26.40
Indian respondents
Heart 23.66 25.26 22.67 23.01
Pacemaker 24.26 26.53 28.19 23.48
Graft 24.42 21.80 29.05 22.96
Note. *Significantly lower than heart, p < .03.
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transplants or blood transfusions conferring a donor’s characteristics, behaviors, or out-
ward circumstances on the recipient.
Further, our data indicate not just the presence of essentialist thinking but also point to
other aspects of its prevalence and nature. We found essentialist thinking in two distinct
samples: Americans and Indians. The presence of essentialist thinking in two different
countries supports the idea that essentialism is a bias that obtains across widely varying
environmental inputs. Additionally, participants endorsed essentialist effects not just fol-
lowing a DNA transplant but also following a heart transplant or blood transfusion. Addi-
tionally, Indians (though not Americans) expected similar effects after transfer of other
types of bodily elements that had long-term associations with the donor (pacemaker, skin
graft). Notably, however, a control study (Study 3) indicated that causal effects were not
deemed plausible when considering money donations, for either Indians or Americans.
Taken together, these data indicate two additional important features of essentialism.
First, causal essence is not promiscuously located in just anything that is associated with
an individual (e.g., money). Second, causal essence is located in parts that biologists
would argue are not, in fact, causally implicated in outward behaviors or qualities (such
as the heart or blood). This latter finding is especially striking, because such a reasoning
error indicates the operation of an essentialist bias independent of knowledge about the
potential causal role of DNA and suggests that respondents often reject formal biological
knowledge in favor of essentialism. (It is worth noting that responses were not universally
indicative of essentialism; indeed, many individuals provided response patterns and open-
ended explanations indicating explicit lack of belief in essentialist effects of transplants,
suggesting that some people favored formal biological knowledge over essentialism. This
is perhaps unsurprising; the explicit measures used in the current study were almost
certainly conservative in their ability to detect essentialism.)
We suggest that it is people’s representation of essence per se that is responsible for
the effects. This is an important point, because the very existence of an essentialist bias
has been questioned. As described in the Introduction, the minimalist approach argues for
an alternative explanation for most of the findings in studies on essentialism thus far
(Strevens, 2000). Specifically, Strevens argues that people do not represent an essence as
a causal force in drawing inferences about an individual’s features. Instead, according to
the strongest interpretation of this position, people appeal directly to category member-
ship as the basis on which to predict outward features. Our studies demonstrate, in con-
trast, that people who did not expect a transplant to result in a change in category
membership (e.g., from human to pig) nevertheless endorsed the possibility that the trans-
plant could change the recipient’s category-typical behaviors to be more like those of the
animal donor. Thus, category membership was not construed as necessary for outward
features, because causal effects were deemed possible even in the absence of category
change. These findings thus run counter to the predictions of unmediated minimalism.
The findings reflect that people appeal to something more than just non-specific kind-
property links (K-laws) in drawing these sorts of inferences.
Our discussion has focused thus far on unmediated minimalism, but what of mediated
minimalism, according to which people appeal to causal intermediaries in their reasoning?
M. Meyer et al. / Cognitive Science 37 (2013) 703
To account for our data, these causal intermediaries would have to have a range of char-
acteristics: At the very least, they would have to be the sorts of things that can be trans-
ferred via organ transplants, and that exert causal influence on the recipient; they would
have to be inherent; and they would have to be, at least for American adults, internal and
biological. Once the nature of these causal intermediaries is constrained in this way, it
becomes unclear how this view differs from psychological essentialism.3 Psychological
essentialism is characterized as a “placeholder” notion (Medin & Ortony, 1989), indicat-
ing that it does not attribute to people any specific beliefs about the nature of essence.
Placeholder essentialism thus claims simply that people believe in an inherent, causal
something-or-other, which is intimately connected with kind membership, but which is
also separable from it. To suppose that belief in causal intermediaries with these charac-
teristics is a distinct view from psychological essentialism is to saddle essentialism with
more theoretical commitments than it in fact carries. If mediated minimalism is thus to
be a distinct view, it would have to be far more carefully delineated in the literature than
it has been thus far.
The current studies also speak to a related literature examining people’s avoidance of
contact with morally negative individuals and the items with which these individuals have
associated, that is, magical contagion studies. A number of studies in this line of research
have found extreme distaste for even indirect contact with morally negative entities (e.g.,
Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994), findings that were recently extended by work indicating that
people also dislike the idea of receiving organs from such individuals (Hood et al.,
2011). The present studies add to this literature by showing the same distaste for organ
transplants from negative donor types, those different from oneself, or different species.
Importantly, our studies revealed specific reasons for this distaste: People are often
alarmed by thoughts of essence-based changes in behavior or characteristics, as well as
by feelings of contamination and social disapprobation.
Our data also provide insight into cultural differences and similarities in people’s
thinking. Striking similarities across the two countries were observed. Both Americans
and Indians reported liking transplants from animals the least (replicating past studies
suggesting particular distaste for animals as donors, for example, Coffman et al., 1998;
Sanner, 2001a,b), followed by negative donor types, then different-from-self types, and
finally positive types. Respondents from both countries also gave cross-species and
negative donor types high scores on both the essentialist and non-essentialist measures,
suggesting that reasons for distaste for dissimilar or negative entities are shared across
these two cultural contexts.
On the other hand, cross-country differences were also revealed. First, Indian respon-
dents appeared to essentialize cross-species donors more than Americans, as indicated by
a greater difference between scores for these types and baseline similar-to-self types.
Second, Indian respondents also appeared to essentialize more types of transfers than
Americans; specifically, they did not differentiate essentialist predictions for heart,
pacemaker, or skin graft transfer. It may be that Americans and Indians possess distinct
concepts of essence, with Indians treating a broader range of elements as having causal
properties. Alternatively, American and Indian representations of essence may be
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fundamentally similar, but Indians may be more likely to expect internal essences to be
transferred to objects or parts as a result of extensive direct contact with the individual
(see Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994, for discussion of this latter form of essentialism). Further
research is needed to determine which interpretation is valid, as well as the factors that
contribute to people’s tendency to extend essentialist effects to non-internal or non-
biological elements.
The present investigation still leaves open a number of other important issues. For
example, we found evidence for essentialist thinking about a wide range of social catego-
ries. How exactly are these essentialist beliefs to be modeled? Haslam and colleagues
have proposed that, in the social domain, essentialism includes two highly dissociable
(though not mutually exclusive) dimensions: naturalness and entitativity (Haslam et al.,
2000). They argue that some essentialized social groups tend to be conceived of as more
natural or biologically based (e.g., race, gender), whereas other essentialized social groups
tend to be conceived of as more entitative, with members highly similar to one another
(e.g., homosexuals). One might predict that it is only categories deemed biologically
based that would also be considered viable candidates for transferring bodily causal
essence, yet our data suggest that essentialism is influential for more than just categories
considered natural or biologically based such as gender or species. Results from our study
may thus be seen as indicating the existence of pseudo-biological conceptualizations of a
wide range of social categories, a notable finding that warrants further investigation.
Questions for future research include the following: What is the causal route by which
people expect essences from various categories to take their effects? and Does this differ
depending on how natural a category is considered?
Our data also point to potential questions regarding the distinction between category-
based essence versus individual-based essence. Here, we argue that transplants from vari-
ous social and animal categories may be predicted to transfer category-typical attributes,
including personality and behavior. Personality and behavior, however, are also arguably
in equal measure components of one’s individual identity; how might psychological
essentialism function when considering what causal forces underlie unique individuals?
A number of researchers have noted potential parallels as well as areas of disconnect
between essentializing individuals versus categories (Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2005;
Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999; Gutheil, Gelman, Klein, Michos, & Kelaita, 2008; Gutheil
& Rosengren, 1996; Leslie, in press b; Rips, Blok, & Newman, 2006), yet the precise
relationship between the two has not been thoroughly established. Future work within the
domain of transplants may contribute to resolving this; for instance, is a transfer of
essence via a transplant expected to compromise or alter the identity of either the donor
or the recipient? If so, does this draw on the same essentialist intuitions that were
revealed in the current study?
Also unanswered is how essentialist beliefs about bodies develop. A large body of lit-
erature indicates the presence of essentialist beliefs from an early age, and a number of
studies indicate that children expect essence to be located internally (Gelman, 2003).
Might such essentialist thinking be observed when asking children to consider the effects
of transplants (e.g., by asking children to consider the results of trading a heart with a
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pig)? Studies by Johnson (1990) as well as Gottfried, Gelman, and Schultz (1999) provide
intriguing initial evidence that bears on the question of how children reason about trans-
plants. In both sets of studies, children were asked to consider the outcomes of trading
brains with various individuals. Children showed developmental progression in the ability
to recognize how the brain functions to contain thoughts and memories. Johnson addition-
ally compared children’s responses to brain transplant scenarios and other body parts
(heart and mouth). Although children by early elementary school were likely to expect
the traded brain to be the most important factor in determining the recipient’s later
behavior and thinking, they also showed some evidence of expecting the other transplants
to result in causal changes as well; for instance, the majority of children expected a heart
from a mean person would reduce the recipient’s kindness. Future work can extend these
findings by examining precisely what kinds of donors (e.g., members of a wide range of
social groups as well as animals), body parts (e.g., heart vs. blood), and traits (kindness,
intelligence, etc.) might be essentialized in the contexts of transplant scenarios.
Finally, our studies may shed some light on the concerns that real-life transplant
patients may have before and after their procedures. Specifically, our results point to the
possibility that patients may entertain non-scientifically based worries; despite the absence
of medical evidence to suggest that organ transplants or blood transfusions can cause
changes in personality or life circumstances, our respondents still considered such out-
comes possible. Belief in such possibilities, we suggest, is rooted in essentialism—a deep
and pervasive cognitive bias.
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Notes
1. The term “non-essentialist” does not imply denial of essentialism, but rather it is
used to describe beliefs that are not indicative of essentialism.
2. Approximately, twice as many Indian respondents were obtained due to higher vari-
ability in their responses. Standard deviations within each transfer type condition
were approximately two to three times higher in the Indian versus American sample.
3. To clarify, philosophical discussions of essence often invoke something more elab-
orate and specific than what is implied by psychological essentialism. For example,
when Kripke (1980) or Putnam (1975) speak of natural kinds having essences, they
mean to claim in part that there is a particular property, possession of which is both
necessary and sufficient for being a member of the kind. Thus, being H2O is often
claimed to be the essence of water, in the sense that all and only things that are
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H2O count as water—this is just what it is, metaphysically or scientifically speak-
ing, for something to be water. For additional discussion of different kinds of
essentialism, see Gelman, 2003; Chapter 1 and Leslie, in press b.
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